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INTRODUCTION 
Innovations and technological disruptions in the “sharing 
economy” are shifting the contours of urban travel in the United States. 
Carsharing organizations such as car2go and Zipcar have grown 
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exponentially over the past decade, expanding their memberships from 
52,347 in 2004 to 1,181,087 in 2015.1 Ridesourcing companies like Lyft 
and Uber, which were entirely absent from most U.S. cities as recently as 
2010, are now global powerhouses, each reportedly worth billions of 
dollars.2 Private investors, after avoiding investments in urban transit 
services for more than half a century, are now offering venture capital for 
Bridj, Chariot, and other companies. 
This Article explores the dynamics of “shared mobility” and the 
policy issues facing the participants in that sector through a review of the 
evolution of four prominent types of shared mobility providers: (1) 
carsharing organizations; (2) transportation network companies such as Lyft 
and Uber; (3) privately operated “microtransit” operators; and (4) crowd-
sourced intercity bus lines. The analytical portion of the study in Part I 
describes and critiques how these sectors have evolved and summarizes the 
notable legal and policy issues they face. Part II develops a typology that 
categorizes their services and shows how each has disrupted the 
transportation sector. The last section also offers conclusions and 
suggestions for further study. 
All of these shared-mobility transportation providers are 
centerpieces of an app-based mobility revolution that is raising the profile 
of the sharing economy, which is defined here as “the peer-to-peer-based 
activity of obtaining, giving, or sharing the access to goods and services, 
coordinated through community-based online service.”3 All have spurred 
innovations to foster more efficient use of scarce resources and reduce 
transportation, particularly in densely-populated neighborhoods with 
populations seeking alternatives to private car ownership. Fueled by 
changing consumer values, economic and environmental pressures, and 
technological innovation, new options have emerged that allow consumers 
to engage in what is commonly called “collaborative consumption.”4 
  Collaborative consumption is characterized by a movement of 
consumers away from typical property market exchanges where consumers 
purchase and own goods outright. Instead, they move to a system aided by 
mobile apps in which purchases provide only temporary access to a good or 
                                                 
 1. Susan A. Shaheen & Adam Cohen, Innovative Mobility Carsharing Outlook: 
Market Overview, Analysis, and Trends, TRANSP. RES. CTR. U. CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY, 
Summer 2015, at 1. 
 2. See From Zero to Seventy (Billion): The Accelerated Life and Times of the World’s 
Most Valuable Startup, ECONOMIST (Sept. 3, 2016), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21706249-accelerated-life-and-times-worlds-
most-valuable-startup-zero-seventy. 
 3. Juho Hamari, Mimmi Sjöklint, & Antti Ukkonen, The Sharing Economy: Why 
People Participate in Collaborative Consumption,  67 J. ASS’N FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH., no. 9, 
2016, at 2047, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/255698095_The_Sharing_Economy_Why_People
_Participate_in_Collaborative_Consumption.  
 4. Id. 
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service.5 The rise in this form of consumption, some argue, is not only the 
result of changing technologies and values, but is also spurring 
technological change and encouraging consumers to reassess their views on 
ownership, which has historically been, as Fleura Bardhi and Giana M. 
Eckhardt maintain, “the ultimate expression of consumer desire.”6 As 
Koopman, Mitchell, and Thierer note, such “permissionless innovation” 
fosters greater consumer choice and more comfortable, inexpensive, and 
faster travel options.7 In many places where travelers once had only a few 
alternatives to reach their destinations—such as taking a bus, train, or 
private car—they now have an entire range of alternatives. 
The challenges that the expansion of shared-mobility services pose 
for municipal governments has generated a sizeable body of legal and 
policy analysis.8 Some of this analysis concludes that the sector’s rise is 
generating large social costs.9 One analysis makes the argument that 
because transactions made in the sharing economy are motivated by 
economic gain, mediated by third parties, and take place among buyers and 
sellers that do not know each other, they are not really “sharing” at all.10 
Regardless, the rise of shared mobility creates a pressing need for additional 
consideration of the way this sector operates and the many disruptions now 
occurring in urban transportation. 
I. TYPES OF SHARED-MOBILITY SERVICES 
Although the analysis below identifies four major types of shared-
mobility providers prevalent in urban areas, it all shows that, despite all the 
variety, two distinct business models have emerged: peer-to-peer and 
business-to-consumer. 
Peer-to-Peer Business Model: Firms using this model provide a 
technological platform on which a “membership community” shares access 
to other members’ properties. Pioneered by eBay, this model is typically 
coupled with rating systems for consumers and suppliers, thereby 
                                                 
 5. Id. at 2050. 
 6. Fleura Bardhi & Giana M. Eckhardt, Access-Based Consumption: The Case of Car 
Sharing, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 881, 881 (2012). 
 7.  Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell, & Adam Thierer, The Sharing 
Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529, 540 (2015). 
 8. See Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local Government 
Policy: The Future of Local Regulation of the “Sharing Economy”, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 
903 (2015); see Koopman, Mitchell, & Thierer, supra note 7; see Andrew T. Bond, Note, An 
App for That: Local Governments and the Rise of the Sharing Economy, 90 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 77 (2015). 
 9. See Brishen Rogers, Note, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 
85 (2015). 
 10. See Giana M. Eckhardt & Fleura Bardhi, The Sharing Economy Isn’t About 
Sharing at All, HARVARD BUS. REV. ONLINE, (Jan. 28, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/01/the-
sharing-economy-isnt-about-sharing-at-all. 
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eliminating the so-called “lemon problem” that can be pervasive when 
buyers and sellers have asymmetric information about quality.11 The 
efficiencies of having all transactions occur on one platform have allowed 
for extraordinarily fast expansion at some firms. Among the notable 
examples are carsharing companies Getaround and Turo and ridesourcing 
providers Lyft and Uber, all of which have sophisticated systems of using 
independent contracting for drivers.12 Firms using this model avoid the cost 
of complexity in having to own and maintain vehicles, which dramatically 
reduces the capital outlays needed to expand. 
Business-to-Consumer Models: This model generally involves 
providing both a communication platform and directly providing vehicles 
and other equipment needed for transportation, which in many cases is a 
vehicle that is temporarily turned over to a member. Firms in this category 
generally provide access to company-owned vehicles. Notable examples are 
the carsharing companies car2go and ZipCar, bikesharing programs, scooter 
rental firms like Scoot, and Microtransit providers such as Bridj and 
Chariot. 
  The analysis begins with consideration of carsharing, followed by 
an overview of transportation network companies, “microtransit” 
operations, and crowd-sourced intercity bus lines. 
A. Carsharing 
Carsharing is a system of car rentals in which people can rent 
vehicles for short periods, often by the hour or mile. Firms in this sector 
generally operate on a membership-based model, which typically entails 
paying an annual fee that provides automatic insurance coverage to 
motorists. Several aspects of carsharing make it different from conventional 
car renting: cars are available only to members; members are required to 
return a clean vehicle by the agreed-upon time, lest they have their 
membership revoked; carsharers do not enter a separate contract every time 
with each use, but instead are billed by usage volume; and carsharers are 
generally required to fill up when the gasoline tank runs low—a burden 
generally eased by making a credit card available inside the car. 
                                                 
 11. See Xiang Hui et al., Reputation & Regulations: Evidence from eBay, 62 MGMT. 
SCI., no. 12, December 2016, 
http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/pdf/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2323; see generally George A. 
Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. 
J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
 12. See Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and Regulatory 
Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber, 19 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 293 (2016). 
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1. Evolution and Expansion. 
Carsharing has enjoyed remarkable expansion since it first attracted 
significant policymaker attention in the late 1990s. Although informal 
forms of carsharing have been around for at least a half-century, Car 
Sharing Portland is widely regarded as the country’s first large-scale 
program, establishing a strong presence in Oregon’s largest city starting in 
1998.13 Drawing upon the lessons of carsharing in Canada and Europe, this 
pioneering nonprofit, like most early entrants, emphasized a “neighborhood 
residential model” with pods largely concentrated in densely-populated 
housing areas as well as having cars available in a city’s downtown 
district.14 As this operator gained a loyal following in the Portland market, 
many others came onto the scene in other U.S. cities, often with nonprofit 
charters.15 With local governments actively working to promote carsharing, 
many specialty locations emerged, including pods at government facilities, 
airports, and universities, giving this sector even greater visibility.16 By 
2008, carsharing had a foothold in dozens of smaller cities and suburbs 
across the country.17 
During their formative years, carsharing organizations conducted 
extensive research to underscore their unique value to the community. 
Many sought to meet the formal definitions for “carsharing organizations,” 
which required them to document their commitment to civic-minded goals 
and neighborhood improvements—requirements that only some were able 
to meet.18 Those meeting this definition were often rewarded with a 
heightened ability to negotiate with local governments for much-needed 
resources, such as vacant property and on-street spots for vehicle parking, 
as well as technical assistance. Some organizations received grants from 
philanthropic organizations to fund expansion into low-income 
neighborhoods and other poorly-served areas. 
Gradually, however, this sector acquired a more “big business” 
character dominated by a few large national or global players.19 The supply 
of cars became increasingly dominated by private sector providers, 
including Zipcar, which grew into the country’s largest for-profit provider 
                                                 
 13. Richard Katzev, Carsharing: A New Approach to Urban Transportation 
Problems, 3 ANALYSES OF SOC. ISSUES AND PUB. POL’Y 65, 68 (2003). 
 14. Alice Biesczat & Joseph B. Schwieterman, Are Taxes On Carsharing Too High: A 
Review of the Public Benefits and Tax Burden of an Expanding Transportation Sector, 
CHADDICK INST. FOR METROPOLITAN DEV. DEPAUL U., June 28, 2011, at 4. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Adam Millard-Ball et al., Carsharing: Where and How It Succeeds, TRANSIT 
COOPERATIVE RES. PROGRAM, REP. 108, 2005, at 2-3. 
 19. See Chris Brown, CarSharing: State of the Market and Growth Potential, 
AUTORENTAL NEWS (Mar./Apr. 2015), http://www.autorentalnews.com/channel/rental-
operations/article/story/2015/03/carsharing-state-of-the-market-and-growth-potential.aspx. 
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and became known for its aggressive advertising and expansion. The 
Boston-based company went public in 2011 before being acquired by Avis 
Budget Group in 2013.20 As a subsidiary of the larger Avis Budget Group, 
Zipcar provides vehicles for hourly or daily use in over thirty major metro 
markets and at over 500 college campuses worldwide.21 Zipcar now reports 
having more than 10,000 vehicles in its worldwide fleet.22 The company’s 
website, symbolic of most car sharing companies, touts the slogan “Own 
the trip, not the car.”23 
Zipcar has also worked to push the technological frontier, providing 
members access to its vehicles using a sensor-embedded card that unlocks 
the vehicle’s doors.24 “Zipsters” are able to select among several insurance 
options and have access to vehicles ranging from Mini Coopers to cargo 
vans.25 Mileage is restricted to 180 miles per day with fuel included.26 
Originally, Zipcar required members to travel round-trip, returning the car 
to the same pod in which it was picked up, but the company recently began 
experimenting with one-way trips within a city, allowing cars to be dropped 
off at any designated company pod.27 Hourly access rates average around 
nine dollars, location dependent.28 
The second largest U.S. operator, Enterprise CarShare, has vehicles 
available in twenty-eight U.S. cities.29 Enterprise houses many of its cars at 
its vast network of neighborhood car rental locations but keeps the process 
of reserving a carsharing vehicle distinct from regular car rentals.30 While 
Car2go allows cars to be reserved on a per-minute basis,31 Enterprise only 
                                                 
 20. Shawn Langhois, Zipcar Zooms 56% Higher in IPO, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 14, 
2011), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/zipcar-zooms-60-higher-in-ipo-2011-04-14; Avis 
Budget Group Completes Acquisition of Zipcar, AVIS BUDGET GROUP (Mar. 14, 2013), 
http://ir.avisbudgetgroup.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=748594. 
 21.Zipcar Overview, ZIPCAR, http://www.zipcar.com/press/overview (last visited Mar. 
29, 2017). 
 22. Welcome to Zipcar, ZIPCAR, www.zipcar.com/communitycar (last visited Mar. 29, 
2017). 
 23. ZIPCAR, www.zipcar.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
 24. How does Zipcar Work?, ZIPCAR, http://www.zipcar.com/how (last visited Apr. 
16, 2017). 
 25. Id. 
 26. What’s Included, ZIPCAR, http://www.zipcar.com/how/whatsincluded/cofc (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
 27. Billy Steel, Zipcar Tests Pay-Per Miles Pricing for Short Trips, ENGADGET (June 
28, 2016), http://www.engadget.com/2016/06/28/zipcar-tests-pay-per-mile. 
 28. Joseph P. Schwieterman & Alice Biesczat, A Review of the Changing Prices and 
Taxation Levels for Neighborhood Carsharing in the United States: 2011 – 2016 (Nov. 
2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 29. ENTERPRISE CARSHARE, https://www.enterprisecarshare.com/us/en/home.html (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
 30. Our Story, ENTERPRISE CARSHARE, https://www.enterprisecarshare.com/us/en/our-
story.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
        31.    How Much does car2go Cost?, CAR2GO, 
https://www.car2go.com/US/en/portland/how/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2017). 
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allows cars to be reserved on a per-hour basis;32 and, unlike Zipcar, which 
provides worldwide access,33 Enterprise generally provides members access 
to vehicles in one city.34  
Ranking third in size in this country—but regarded as the largest 
carsharing company in the world due to its international operations—is 
car2go, which has expanded beyond its home city of Austin, Texas, to six 
other U.S. cities.35 This company emphasizes short one-way trips, with 
many of its consumers using its cars for trips spanning just a few minutes, 
hopping in for a quick drive and leaving the car at an on-street parking spot 
near their destination.36 In some cities, users are allowed to leave cars at any 
publicly available parking spot, including spaces that are metered.37 
The recent expansion of car2go, a subsidiary of Daimler AG, has 
drawn attention to a major move by automotive companies into 
carsharing.38 Auto companies see having a stake in this niche as an 
incremental step toward preparing themselves for changing business 
practices coming—the eventual widespread deployment of autonomous 
vehicles, which some analysts maintain is only a decade away.39 Audi, 
BMW, Ford, and General Motors, following Daimler’s lead, invested 
heavily in U.S. carsharing brands.40 Some (including BMW’s ReachNow) 
are experimenting with such sophisticated techniques as pay-per-minute 
pricing that differentiate between time spent driving versus parked.41 
Keeping a lower profile in this high-stakes game are many smaller 
providers that are largely confined to individual cities. These include: 
Buffalo CarShare, City CarShare (San Francisco, California), eGo CarShare 
(Denver, Colorado), Hourcar (Chicago, Illinois), and CarHopper (multiple 
cites).38 Several are working to expand the availability of one-way 
carsharing, which, as previously noted, is administratively complex but 
gives users more flexibility and is seen as a “must” to meet the rising 
expectations of consumers.39 At some companies, such as Indianapolis’s 
                                                 
        32.    FAQ, ENTERPRISE CARSHARE, https://www.enterprisecarshare.com/us/en/faq.html 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2017). 
        33.   How does Zipcar Work?, ZIPCAR, https://www.zipcar.com/how (last visited Apr. 
16, 2007). 
        34.   FAQ, ENTERPRISE CARSHARE, 
https://www.enterprisecarshare.com/us/en/faq.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2017). 
 35. Your New Ride[s], CAR2GO, https://www.car2go.com/US/en/#152743 (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2017). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. car2go, DAIMLER, https://www.daimler.com/products/services/mobility-
services/car2go/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
 39. Jared Lindzon, Why Auto Makers Encourage Car Sharing Despite Trend Away 
from Ownership, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 25, 2015). 
 40. Schwieterman & Biesczat, supra note 28, at 3. 
 41. Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 4. 
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BlueIndy, electric vehicles circulate freely, allowing members to pick up 
cars at on-street parking spots with charging stations and drop them off at 
any electricity-equipped spot they choose.42 
The past several years have seen particularly rapid growth in peer-
to-peer carsharing, which allows users to rent cars owned by individuals 
living nearby. Among the largest entities in this category is Getaround, 
which now operates in the San Francisco Bay Area; Portland, Oregon; 
Chicago; and Washington, D.C.43 This firm emphasizes, in a manner 
similar to Zipcar, that it reduces the need to own a personal vehicle.44 The 
company’s research indicates that, “Sharing your car on Getaround takes 
ten cars off the road.”45 
Getaround reduces the legal issues associated with allowing 
members to rent their private cars to another member by offering insurance 
as part of every transaction, as well as extensive customer service.46 It also 
restricts car use to round-trip journeys and limits travel to 200 miles per 
day.47 Unlike those using Zipcar and other neighborhood carsharing 
companies, users are responsible for their own fuel costs.48 Vehicle owners 
independently set their own hourly or daily rates for use of their cars, 
resulting in considerable fluctuation in prices from place to place.49 In some 
markets, hourly rates range from a low of six dollars for small cars to sixty 
dollars for specialty vehicles, while the most common daily rates are often 
around forty dollars.50 Some vehicles have designated parking spaces—
perhaps in the owner’s driveway—but street parking is more common.51 
2. Notable Research 
Carsharing has generated much more research than the other three 
sectors considered in this study. Much of this research focuses on 
                                                 
 42. Ready to BlueIndy? Follow the guide!, BLUEINDY, https://www.blue-
indy.com/how-does-it-work (last visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
 43. GETAROUND, https://www.getaround.com/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
 44. Why Getaround, GETAROUND, https://www.getaround.com/tour (last visited Mar. 
29, 2017). 
 45. Benefits of Sharing your Car, GETAROUND, 
https://www.getaround.com/tour/benefits (last visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
 46. Why Getaround, GETAROUND, https://www.getaround.com/tour (last visited Mar. 
29, 2017). 
 47. Is There A Mileage Cap?, GETAROUND, https://help.getaround.com/hc/en-
us/articles/204371464-Is-there-a-mileage-cap- (last visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
 48. Who Pays For Gas?, GETAROUND, https://help.getaround.com/hc/en-
us/articles/204371454-Who-pays-for-gas- (last visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
 49. Fee and Commission Schedule, GETAROUND, 
https://www.getaround.com/terms/fees (last visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Parking, GETAROUND, https://help.getaround.com/hc/en-us/sections/200788784-
Parking (last visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
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carsharing’s environmental, economic, and social benefits.52 The benefits 
are particularly significant with respect to reducing social costs linked to 
private vehicle operation, such as air pollution, congestion, and vehicle 
accidents.53 
Urban planners take particular interest in the growing body of 
evidence indicating that carsharing promotes active lifestyles by 
encouraging more walking and biking.54 By reducing the amount of land 
that is devoted to both on-street and off-street parking, carsharing can also 
help foster improved open space and public safety.55 The criticism that 
carsharing makes automobile travel easier, thus encouraging a car-
dependent lifestyle, has been countered by research showing that carsharing 
tends not to substantially reduce the use of public transit.56 This 
phenomenon is often attributed to the tendency for those sharing cars to 
make decisions differently than those who have large “sunk” investments in 
a private vehicle.57 Since they pay for every trip, they use buses and trains 
more regularly than vehicle owners, who often view the incremental cost of 
driving as little more than the fuel.58 
Comparatively less research exists on the cost of carsharing for 
consumers, although several studies have surveyed consumers about the 
importance of cost in their decision to purchase a carshare membership.59 
This research suggests that many consumers are quite sensitive to price.60 
After evaluating membership fees of more than two-dozen carsharing 
organizations, Shaheen, Cohen, and Roberts conclude that keeping prices 
low is an important factor that can spur growth.61 Schwieterman and 
Biesczat show that the per-hour cost of carsharing fell by about five percent 
between 2011 and 2016, but rising taxes have offset about a third of this 
drop.62 When adjusted for inflation, these researchers show that prices have 
                                                 
 52. See Elliot Martin & Susan Shaheen, Impacts of Car2Go on Vehicle Ownership, 
Modal Shift, Vehicle Miles Traveled, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions: An Analysis of Five 
North American Cities, TRANSP. RES. CTR. U. CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY, Jul. 2016. 
 53. See Millard-Ball et al., supra note 18. 
 54. See Todd Litman, Evaluating Carsharing Benefits, TRANSP. RES. REC., Sept. 17, 
2015, at 31-32. 
 55. See Donald Shoup, The High Cost of Free Parking, 17 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 3 
(1997). 
 56. See Elliot Martin & Susan Shaheen, Greenhouse Gas Emission Impacts of 
Carsharing in North America, 12 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INTELLIGENT TRANSP. SYS., no. 4, 
Dec. 2011. 
 57. See id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Cindy Costain, Carolyn Arddron, & Khandker Nurul Habib, Synopsis of 
Users’ Behavior of a Carsharing Program: A Case Study in Toronto, DEP’T CIVIL ENG’G U. 
TORONTO (Jan. 2012). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Susan Shaheen, Adam P. Cohen, & J. Darius Roberts, Carsharing in North 
America: Market Growth, Current Developments, and Future Potential, U. CAL. DAVIS INST. 
TRANSP. STUDIES, 2005, at 14. 
 62. Schwieterman & Biesczat, supra note 28, at 6. 
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dropped by more than ten percent, making carsharing more affordable than 
in previous years.63 
The falling price of carsharing, they argue, follows a pattern that is 
pervasive among “infant industries” that launch services using an 
experimental business model and gradually benefit from heightened 
technical sophistication and economies of scale.64 Indeed, carsharing, with 
its emphasis on short-hop urban trips and a high rate of vehicle utilization, 
has proven to be an effective way to experiment with electric vehicles and 
smaller cars that achieve high fuel efficiency.65 
3. Policy Issues and Outlook. 
Of the four mobility groupings considered in this study, carsharing 
faces the fewest policy hurdles. This is due, in part, to its legal classification 
as a “rental” rather than a “service.”66 This allows the sector to sidestep 
some of the thorny issues associated with the regulation of transportation 
services. Accordingly, the sector generally does not face challenges about 
whether it is violating governmental rules about the procedures that need to 
be followed and permits needed before launching transportation services, 
which in some locales casts a pall over Lyft, Uber, and microtransit 
operators.67 
Peer-to-peer carsharing faces somewhat more vexing legal 
problems due to still unresolved insurance issues related to the legal 
liability of driving other peoples’ private cars.68 This problem is severe 
enough that it prompted RelayRides to withdraw from the state of New 
York.69 Nevertheless, in most states, these issues are gradually being 
resolved and do not pose an existential threat to the sector. 
At the same time, all forms of carsharing face the specter of rising 
retail taxes.70 In fact, the taxes these operators face is in many cities higher 
than nearly every other sector of the economy.71 Despite the fact that many 
other sectors of the sharing economy are not taxed at the retail level, this 
sector faces the almost universal requirement that carsharers pay all taxes 
                                                 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 14. 
 65. Shaheen, Cohen, & Roberts, supra note 61, at 3. 
 66. Millard-Ball et al., supra note 18, at 6-10. 
 67. Joseph P. Schwieterman & Heather Spray, When Sharing is Taxing: Comparing 
the Tax Burden on Carsharing Services in Major U.S. Cities, CHADDICK INST. FOR 
METROPOLITAN DEV. DEPAUL U. (July 21, 2016) at 3. 
 68. See Carsharing: The Legality of An Innovative Industry, MOISAN LEGAL P.C. 
BLOG (Feb. 12, 2016), http://moisanlegal.com/lawyer/2016/02/12/Recent-News/Carsharing-
The-Legality-of-an-Innovative-Industry_bl23539.htm. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Schwieterman & Spray, supra note 67, at 3. 
 71. Id. 
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that are paid by users of conventional car rental services.72 This often adds 
more than twenty percent to the cost of many reservations.73 The authors 
are aware of only three states—Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Oregon—where 
concessions have been made for carsharing.74 The applicability of 
transaction-based (lump-sum) taxes, such as add-on fees to pay for sports 
stadiums and convention centers, is particularly significant in many 
locales.75 These often add two to four dollars to even the shortest carsharing 
trip.76 As a result, in many cities, users face tax rates that are several times 
the sales tax rate, despite the apparent desire of many local governments to 
have carsharing grow. 
Schwieterman and Spray have computed the average tax on various 
sectors of the economy.77 This research shows that carsharing faces retail 
taxes only slightly higher than two-day neighborhood car rentals and airline 
travel, but far higher than all of the other sectors considered, including 
hotels rooms, general retail merchandise (subject to sales taxes), and 
ridesourcing operators like Lyft and Uber, which generally are not subject 
to retail taxes (Figure 1).78 
 
FIGURE 1 
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This research also provides evidence that carsharing is being 
affected by rising competition from largely untaxed “ridesourcing” 
services, which often provide transportation at lower cost. Carsharing also 
faces rising competition from traditional car rental services, which, in some 
locales, now offer hourly rentals.79 
These implications are amplified by recent research suggesting that 
the growth of the carsharing sector has stalled.80 Between 2013 and 2014, 
the number of available carsharing vehicles (not including peer-to-peer 
vehicles) increased from 16,811 to 19,115.81 From the end of that period 
through early 2015, however, available vehicles dropped to 16,754.82 
Although some of this 11.7% decline may be due to seasonal issues related 
to the timing of the counts, a concurrent drop in the number of carsharing 
members suggests that neighborhood carsharing, at a minimum, is no longer 
poised for the rapid expansion that has been long associated with this 
sector.83 
A final issue affecting the carsharing sector is the apparent 
diminished interest from local governments in providing favorable parking 
spots.84 This shift in the sector’s status from one dominated by nonprofit 
providers to one dominated by large for-profit firms owned by international 
conglomerates has led to a belief that these firms can afford to pay market 
rates for parking—despite evidence highlighting the mounting competition 
this sector faces.85 
B. Transportation Network Companies 
Transportation network companies (“TNCs”) are entities that use “a 
digital network to connect riders to drivers for the purposes of pre-
arranging and providing transportation.”86 The largest companies in this 
category, Lyft and Uber, have networks across the world to connect riders 
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and drivers.87 These services in many ways resemble high-tech taxicab 
operations and have been reviewed critically by many local governments 
that have regulated cab fares and service levels for decades.88 
The lexicon used to describe this sector can be somewhat 
confusing. “Ride hailing” and “real-time ridesharing” are both used to 
describe the mobile application-based services of TNCs.89 In this study, the 
term “ridesourcing” is deemed most appropriate. As Rayle, Dai, Chan, 
Cervero, and Shaheen observe, this term captures the basic platform 
involving a pool of drivers and a means of “sourcing” rides.90 Regardless of 
what term or phrase is used, however, some ambiguities remain. For 
example, it is important to acknowledge that some of the same “sourcing” 
features used by TNCs are also used by taxi companies, which are not 
regarded as part of this sector.91 
1. Evolution and Expansion. 
In the most basic sense, some form of ridesourcing has been around 
for years. Airport shuttles run by hotels often dynamically change their 
routes based on their guests’ requests. Many jitney operators have long 
provided a flexible route service based on requests for pickups.92 Still, the 
level of customer awareness and sophistication of ridesharing has grown 
exponentially in the past six years.93 
Uber, after launching in many U.S. cities in 2010, quickly grew to 
encompass five distinct services.94 Most consumers are familiar with 
UberX, which is akin to an app-based taxi that connects passengers to local 
drivers who respond to pickup requests.95 Passengers are taken straight to 
their destinations without additional passenger pickups or drop-offs. When 
many say, “let’s Uber it,” they are often referring to this service. 
Gradually, Uber differentiated from its original offering. For groups 
needing larger vehicles with room for up to six people, UberXL has become 
widely available.96 A more luxurious service, UberBLACK, offers black 
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vehicles that are relatively new and feature black leather interiors.97 Slightly 
less costly is UberSELECT, which offers luxury transportation without 
assurances that the vehicle will be black.98 Another top-of-the-line option is 
UberLUX, which offers the guarantee of being picked up in a BMW 7-
Series, Mercedes Benz S-Class, or other high-end luxury vehicle.99 
Lyft has followed a similar growth trajectory, starting in San 
Francisco and gradually expanding throughout the United States and 
abroad.100 In 2016, the company invested heavily in growing LyftPremier, a 
luxury version of its “classic” service that is similar to UberBLACK.101 
Lyft has reported that sixty percent of its customers have requested a luxury 
vehicle at least once.102 
Among the most significant strategic initiatives by these firms in 
recent years has been the development of LyftLine and UberPOOL.103 
These services, through an evaluation of a rider’s origin and destination 
compared to the origins and destinations of nearby customers, allow the 
same driver to pick up multiple riders in one multipurpose trip.104 Along 
many of these routes, which are often broadly described as “ride-splitting,” 
the services are priced only a few dollars more than public transit service.105 
After beta-testing UberPOOL in San Francisco, Uber formally 
launched the service in many cities in August 2014—its first widely 
available service in which several travel parties shared one vehicle at the 
same time.106 Logan Green, Chief Operating Officer of Lyft, was reportedly 
inspired by a carpooling service in Zimbabwe before developing LyftLine, 
which also launched in mid-2014 with a similar goal of keeping costs low 
by building efficiencies into the system and matching riders headed in the 
same direction.107 Both Lyft and Uber stand out for bundling attractive 
features into an easily accessible app-based service that has dramatically 
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expanded carpooling’s availability and geographic reach. Initially, both 
companies deeply subsidized these services, offering discounts to 
encourage riders to try them out.108 
Customers can access these new ride-splitting services by opening 
the app on a smartphone and inputting his or her location and destination. 
The app then displays two prices—a traditional rate and a discounted rate if 
you choose to pool, which is as much as twenty-five percent less costly than 
a private ride (the pool option is now the default choice in the Uber app, 
which has resulted in some riders choosing to share their ride without 
realizing it).109 In this case, the rate quoted to the travel party depends on 
the number of passengers. Once the user chooses the pool option, a driver is 
assigned to them.110 The user may be the second or third pickup on a trip or 
the only rider, though they are not made aware of this at the time the 
reservation is made.111 
A related service offered by these companies matches commuters 
who travel to the same destination but are otherwise uninterested in making 
shared-ride trips over the course of the day. UberCommute and Lyft 
Carpool are both attempting to achieve such “carpool facilitation” through 
their mobile apps.112 Presently, however, both services are in an embryonic 
form. In fact, Lyft recently suspended its carpool operation due to lack of 
driver interest.113 
A variety of other firms have been operating in the carpooling 
facilitation space for longer periods, with Scoop among the most prominent. 
Scoop’s motto is to “replace solo driving with shared commuting,” thus 
reducing single occupancy vehicle trips and even vehicle ownership.114 Like 
most other firms in the sharing economy, this start-up provides only the 
communication platform and does not own or lease vehicles.115 It stands 
out, however, for marketing heavily to employers rather than using the 
more traditional direct-to-consumer approach.116 Interested employers 
cultivate awareness among employees in order to generate enough interest 
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to make Scoop carpools possible.117 Scoop is also notable for guaranteeing 
your ride home, thereby eliminating the concern about needing to leave the 
office by a certain time.118 Many users “blend” modes by taking public 
transit or a ridesharing service in one direction and Scoop in the other. 
Scoop carpools are launched only on routes that have achieved a 
critical mass of demand. This is generally met when 250 people have 
expressed interest between geographically similar home and work 
locations.119 Once achieved, Scoop then launches the route. Recent 
expansion has led to services beyond the San Francisco Bay Area and into 
other metropolitan regions, with new routes reportedly being added daily. 
Scoop touts surge-free pricing and a ten dollar cap on every ride.120 On its 
popular route from Palo Alto to San Francisco, for example, riders pay 
about $7 and the driver receives about $6 per rider.121 This compares 
favorably to CalTrain commuter service, which costs $7.75 one way.122 
2. Notable Research. 
Research on the carpooling sector is far less developed than that on 
carsharing. However, in response to the enormous interest in Lyft and Uber 
from both the general public and transportation agencies, researchers are 
rapidly filling the void. Among the most notable studies, Shared Mobility 
and the Transformation of Public Transit, a publication of the Shared-Use 
Mobility Center in partnership with the American Public Transit 
Association, draws upon survey data from more than 4,500 users across the 
United States.123 This study shows that travelers inclined to take shared-use 
modes including bikesharing, carsharing, and ridesourcing are also more 
likely to use public transit than their non-sharing counterparts.124 These 
sharers have a tendency to own fewer cars and blend different modes to 
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meet their needs.125 Furthermore, “supersharers” live in households that 
average only half as many cars as those public transit users who are less 
reliant on shared-use modes.126 Only about one in five shared-use travelers 
(twenty-one percent) use ridesourcing to commute, while a mere seven 
percent use it daily, suggesting that most shared use is situational in 
nature.127 
The Shared Use Mobility study paints a compelling portrait about 
the manner in which shared mobility can support enhancements to public 
transit. Nonetheless, the study offers several warnings about the 
implications of ridesourcing for transit. Ridesharers tend to be more 
“automobile-centered” than those reliant on other shared-use modes.128 
More than a third (thirty-four percent) indicated they would use a private 
automobile (either alone or with a friend) if ridesourcing wasn’t available, 
while just fourteen percent would use a bus or train.129 Ridesourcers are less 
inclined to live “transit-oriented” lifestyles than carsharers. 
Another notable work, a 2016 survey by Rayle, Dai, Chan, 
Cervero, and Shaheen, conducted “intercept surveys” of several thousand 
ridesourcing and taxicab customers taking trips in the San Francisco 
market.130 This analysis illustrates the extent to which ridesourcing is filling 
demand that was previously unmet. Wait times are found to be markedly 
shorter for ridesourcing than taxis, and customers are found to generally shy 
away from taxi use, which suggests that many ridesourcing trips are newly 
generated.131 Ridersharers tend to be younger, own fewer vehicles, and be 
more likely to travel with companions.132 Among the study’s most basic 
findings, therefore, is that TNCs and taxis tend to serve different markets.133 
Like the Shared-Use Mobility Center study, it also indicates that 
ridesourcing tends to support car-free lifestyles and thus is largely 
complementary to transit use.134 
The revenue model used by ridesourcing and the taxation issues 
this sector faces are explored by Oie and Ring.135 This study evaluates 
Uber’s emphasis on dynamic price adjustments in response to supply and 
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demand shifts, and notes that “surge pricing” is determined through 
algorithms based heavily on variations in wait times.136 Fares are increased, 
often dramatically, when the number of unfulfilled requests grows, which 
happens regularly on Friday and Saturday nights, on holidays, and during 
inclement weather.137 
Oie and Ring also described the negative public reaction to surge 
pricing and how this has spurred the expansion of competing services, most 
notably Gett, which does not change prices in response to demand 
fluctuations.138 Oie and Ring note that, due to Uber’s practice of including a 
twenty percent gratuity in its fares, for several years Uber stressed to 
customers that additional tips were unnecessary.139 This, in turn, stoked 
dissatisfaction among Uber’s drivers. In April 2016, in the wake of class 
action lawsuits involving several states that took into account Uber’s 
categorization of its drivers as independent contractors, the company 
reversed course and began allowing drivers to seek tips.140 
A research team led by Schwieterman used data collectors to make 
fifty “paired trips” between randomly selected points within a transit-rich 
environment in Chicago.141 A pair of data collectors departed 
simultaneously, one taking public transit and the other using UberPOOL, to 
destinations between two and six miles away.142 The results show that 
travel times were relatively equal on trips to and from Chicago’s central 
business district, which means that few commuters are likely to use 
UberPOOL every day.143 However, the time saving increases to about ten 
minutes on trips originating in the “outer downtown” area and reaches 
nearly twenty minutes for trips linking outlying neighborhoods.144 The 
authors conclude that UberPOOL, which generally costs between seven and 
ten dollars, is an attractive option for many different types of journeys, 
including commuter trips that do not involve traveling to the central 
business district.145 This conclusion is supported by federal 
recommendations stating that analysts estimate a value on time savings in 
urban trips at $24.10/hour.146 
As part of the analysis for this paper, the authors reviewed the 
prices of both LyftLine and UberPOOL in the same fifty markets on 
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weekdays during mid-day hours. The average UberPOOL price was $8.52, 
compared to $10.92 for LyftLine.147 The difference in prices was 
proportionately less on longer distance routes than on short ones.148 
Although this analysis did not consider price difference during surge 
periods, it shows that both companies offer less expensive services than 
taxicab rides. 
3. Policy Issues and Outlook 
Many cities are working to find acceptable regulatory frameworks 
for ridesourcing that are palatable for both the TNCs and consumers. Wide 
differences in the regulatory environment and legal interpretations of 
municipal ordinances (most of which were written long before the 
emergence of Lyft and Uber) remain an impediment to expansion. Some 
communities have adopted a “ban first, ask questions later” approach, while 
others have avoided dealing with the sector in a formal way.149 The 
resulting regulatory initiatives tend to fall into two main categories: 
Complying with regulations on taxicabs: The first type of initiative 
involves a push to require TNCs to comply with rate and service regulations 
created for taxi operations. Many of these initiatives seek to apply licensing 
and price controls that Lyft and Uber vociferously argue are incompatible 
with their technological platforms, making this a high-stakes battle.150 
Among the primary arguments used to justify exempting ridesourcing from 
such regulation is that they provide rides that are “prearranged rides,” rather 
than rides obtained through street hailing, which is common for taxicab 
trips.151 In Washington State, to qualify as a prearranged trip, a chauffeur 
must pick up the passenger no sooner than fifteen minutes after the request 
is made—a rule not presently enforced for TNCs.152 The requirement that 
TNC drivers undergo fingerprinting and comply with other regulation in 
Austin, Texas, prompted both companies to immediately withdraw.153 
Similar issues prompted them to pull out of Albany, Buffalo, and Syracuse, 
New York.154 Other cities have struck a compromise by barring TNCs from 
offering airport drop-off and pickup services in a manner similar to taxis.155 
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Requiring drivers to have credentials beyond the training they 
receive from TNCs: Another regulatory challenge involves rules governing 
the needed qualifications to drive vehicles for commercial purposes. In 
some cities, drivers for TNCs are now required to undergo formal training, 
although such training often remains far less than that for traditional taxi 
drivers.156 San Francisco struck a compromise by demanding that TNC 
drivers obtain a business license.157 The practice of classifying drivers as 
private contractors, rather than employees, has also generated litigation.158 
Finally, some cities, such as New York, are exploring regulations 
seeking to deal with congestion, including proposals on how TNCs wait for 
customers in high-traffic areas.159 New York commissioned a traffic study 
and is exploring possible caps on the number of ridesourcing vehicles 
operating in parts of Manhattan and other high-density zones.160  
 
C. Microtransit Service 
This third category consists of firms in the shared-mobility sector 
that offer van and bus services in a much more flexible manner than that 
provided by scheduled public transport services. Microtransit revolves 
around communication platforms that dramatically change how service is 
delivered.161 Firms often utilize smaller vehicles and have schedules that 
routinely change in response to fluctuating supply and demand.162 
Microtransit blends some of the convenience of ridesourcing with the some 
of the predictable aspects of public transit.163 
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1. Evolution and Expansion. 
The growth of microtransit is drawing attention from policymakers 
who had long assumed that public transit was an inherently money-losing 
proposition. Almost all transit service in the United States since World War 
II has been managed by government or quasi-government agencies that rely 
on subsidies from federal, state, and local sources to offset deficits from 
insufficient farebox revenue.164 Believing that competition would “skim the 
cream” from the most lucrative routes, thereby hurting public transit 
operators, many governments impose regulations that bar private 
companies from establishing competing services.165 Some states, such as 
Illinois, require would-be operators to hold public hearings and obtain 
“Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity” before launching 
microtransit services (this process can take months, if permission is granted 
at all).166 
Rapid advances in technology, however, are allowing entrepreneurs 
to fill gaps in transit while differentiating themselves enough from public 
transit operators to make it unclear whether such regulation applies to their 
services. Microtransit often maintains schedules generated by 
“crowdsourcing” apps and does not adhere to fixed schedules for extended 
periods of time.167 Service is offered only to members, which is often 
provided for free and generally provided by vans and other small 
vehicles.168 Companies like Bridj, Chariot, and Via are leaders in this 
category. 
Chariot touts itself as “reinventing mass transit for commuters, 
companies, and fun-seekers with fast, reliable, affordable, and comfortable 
service.”169 This is done through a combination of flexible routing, high 
frequencies, and innovative pricing that is proving to be particularly 
attractive to commuters. Operating only in the San Francisco Bay Area, 
Chariot places emphasis on routes to neighborhoods that suffer from poor 
transit service. Most of its twenty-seven routes within the city and 
neighboring suburbs link residential areas to high-density employment 
areas.170 Routes are determined through a crowd-funding app with revenue 
generated through commitments to buy passes, such as twelve-ride and 
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thirty-day unlimited ride passes, once a route is established.171 Generally, 
125 to 200 riders must “buy in” for a route to be established.172  
  Some Chariot routes, such as its popular route to Glassdoor’s office 
in Mill Valley, California, are employer-sponsored.173 Only those employed 
by this prominent human resources firm can use this route.174 Although data 
on these services is limited, users may find travel times to be markedly less 
than those for local public transit buses, but similar to express or skip-stop 
public transit service. The appeal of such limited-stop schedules encourages 
users to pay more than they would for a regular public bus. 
Bridj employs a similar business model but serves more cities, 
operating in Boston and Kansas City, Missouri.175 The firm’s routes 
nonetheless are confined to relatively small geographic areas within these 
locales and concentrate on linking specific neighborhoods that it feels need 
to be “bridged.”176 Before making a booking, users are provided with a 
price, time, and approximate pickup location.177 After booking, they are 
given a pickup time and a more exact pickup spot at which they should 
wait.178 Similar to public buses, groups of users are requested to congregate 
at a common location to save time, yet—unlike public transit services—all 
are guaranteed seats and provided an estimated arrival time that is 
continuously adjusted.179 
Both companies price their services similarly, with Chariot having 
a $5.00 rate for peak-period rides and a $3.80 rate during off-peak periods, 
while also offering a variety of monthly passes including a popular “all 
access” pass ($119/month).180 Bridj touts that its prices are close to public 
transit fares, generally being in the $1.50-$7.00 range.181 
Another company, Via, operates in Chicago, New York, and 
Washington, D.C.182 Like Bridj and Chariot, Via promotes itself as a 
service that “essentially combines the cheap, communal ride of a bus with 
something close to the door-to-door service of a cab.”183 Although its 
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service is flexible, travelers are directed to specified curbside locations to 
allow drivers to service several passengers at each stop, thereby lowering 
travel times.184 An important difference between Via and its two peers, 
however, is that it stresses ultra-low fares to compete with other shared 
mobility providers, such as UberPool.185 In two cities, Via offers one-way 
pricing as low as $2.15, which undercuts even public transit.186 
A more specialized startup, Scoot, is a point-to-point electric 
scooter sharing service.187 With stations throughout San Francisco, it 
advertises as being “as fast as taxis, as cheap as the bus, and as fun as your 
bike.”188 The firm makes the process simple and predictable by having 
designated parking spots.189 Although little has been published about this 
service and its popularity is affected greatly by the weather, it appears to 
primarily cater to those making trips that are only a few miles long and 
would take a half-hour or less on public transit. Still, Scoot stands out for its 
flexibility. Consumers can change destinations at any point, making it 
similar to the on-the-go nature of bikesharing.190 
2. Notable Research 
Little scholarly research exists on microtransit. The Shared-Use 
Mobility Center describes Bridj and Chariot as “private shuttle services” for 
customers who are willing to pay slightly higher prices in exchange for 
added comfort and service.191 The Center also concludes that, “Dynamic 
route-generating technology used by many of these services also has 
tremendous potential for transit and para-transit services.”192 The Ford 
Motor Company reported that Bridj had a fleet of 100 vehicles and 
considerable expansion potential upon acquiring the company in September 
2016.193 
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3. Policy Issues and Outlook 
Microtransit operators face a delicate balancing act in trying to 
demonstrate that they enhance mobility and environmental goals while 
avoiding the appearance of being bona fide transit operators. Looming over 
them is the specter of government action to shut them down by applying 
regulation that is designed to preserve the monopoly status of public transit 
operators. In some cities, authorities could require that microtransit 
operators receive Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity to 
remain in operation. 
Bus services such as Bridj and Chariot are particularly vulnerable 
due to their status as companies that operate a transportation service—they 
own the vehicles and hire the drivers, much like transit companies—rather 
than simply maintaining communication platforms. The requirement that 
passengers register on the firms’ websites to become members, however, 
insulates them somewhat from regulatory challenges.194 Yet, microtransit 
faces some of the same threats as Lyft and Uber related to the applicability 
of taxicab regulations, making the future difficult to predict. A smaller firm, 
Leap, received a cease-and-desist from the California Public Utilities 
Commission after starting operations before it had all of the necessary 
licenses from the state.195 
D. Crowdsourced Intercity Bus Operators 
This final category involves firms that facilitate intercity trips, i.e., 
those that extend beyond the limits of a metropolitan region. Like 
microtransit, the participants in this sector seek to establish viable routes 
through crowdsourcing and compete heavily with private car travel.196 
Rather than operating routes served by public transit, however, they 
compete with intercity buses, Amtrak, and commercial airlines.197 Rally 
Bus198 and Skedaddle199 are the most prominent operators in this sector. 
1. Evolution and Expansion 
For many years, the federal government considered bus service 
akin to a public utility, controlled how carriers entered and exited interstate 
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routes, and regulated the prices carriers charged.200 Additional regulation as 
intrastate routes—those confined to a single state—was enforced by state 
governments.201 By the mid-1970s, however, the intercity bus industry was 
struggling, and governments everywhere recognized the need for reform.202 
The rate of car ownership in the U.S. had risen to more than eighty percent, 
and airlines were experimenting with steeply discounted fares.203 Many 
small-town bus routes were dropped, leaving many communities without 
service.204 
The industry’s partial deregulation through the Bus Regulatory 
Reform Act in 1982 afforded the industry new marketing freedoms.205 The 
Act relieved the industry of federal controls on pricing and routes and 
provided a mechanism for bus companies to appeal regulations imposed 
upon them by state governments on intrastate routes.206 Still, many 
intrastate regulations remained in place and continue today. This makes it 
possible to operate from, for example, Atlanta, Georgia, to Jacksonville, 
Florida, without the need for governmental permission, while still needing 
to obtain permission and comply with rate and schedule regulations on in-
state trips from Atlanta to Augusta.207 
The industry’s long retrenchment culminated in the bankruptcy of 
Greyhound and cutbacks by many smaller carriers, including various 
Trailways lines, before the sector experienced a turnaround in the early 
2000s.208 Bus service for relatively short distance routes began to attract a 
new customer base, often travelers who were less attached to the car than 
their predecessors.209 Particularly brisk expansion occurred among 
“Chinatown operators” linking the Chinatown districts in Manhattan with 
Boston and Washington, D.C.210 These operators often operated in a legal 
“grey area,” failing to keep adequate records on vehicle maintenance or 
employee service hours and most did not publish printed timetables.211 
The recovery began slowly and entered a new era when several 
city-to-city express operators—including Megabus, which began in the 
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Midwest in 2006212—entered the fray. Megabus soon expanded to most 
heavily-populated regions of the country and relied heavily on “curbside” 
pickup and drop-off rather than using conventional stations.213 BoltBus, 
Vamoose, and other carriers expanded in the Eastern United States.214 
Sensing the timing was right for large-scale investments, major capital 
flowed into the intercity travel sector. 
These developments dramatically improved the public image of 
intercity bus travel.215 In the wake of this comeback came the development 
of technological platforms that allowed bus services to set schedules 
through crowdsourcing.216 If enough travelers expressed a willingness to 
pay, a bus would operate between two points on a particular day.217 Rally 
Bus and Skedaddle emerged as market leaders in this category, both 
allowing the individual who launches the bus trip to travel for free if 
enough other riders sign up.218 The fares rise as the number of reservations 
increases.219 If the trip fails to attract enough riders, it does not operate and 
no fares are collected.220  
2. Notable Research. 
The wide body of research on intercity bus service contrasts sharply 
with the paucity of technical analysis that exists on crowdsourced routes.221 
As part of the research for the present study, the authors tracked a number 
of routes advertised by Skedaddle. The firm’s number of routes (not all of 
which attracted enough riders to go “live”) was found to vary widely by 
season. The analysis identified 242 routes on June 15, 2016, but just fifty-
six routes on September 16, 2016, which suggests that there may be wide 
month-by-month variation.222 Although most routes involve travel to 
festivals, musical and sporting events, and other cultural activities, some 
resemble intercity services, with some trips even leaving from locations 
advertised as near the Port Authority Bus Terminal in New York.223 At 
present, however, this sector should be regarded only as an infant industry. 
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3. Policy Issues and Outlook. 
Crowdsourced intercity bus operators are more effectively buffered 
from regulatory threats than TNCs and microtransit service.224 Their focus 
on city-to-city service and similarities on what is commonly regarded as 
“charter bus service” allows them to sidestep most bureaucratic hurdles.225 
Moreover, by “work[ing] with only the highest quality professional bus 
operators in your area” the company seeks to avoid concerns that it keeps 
costs low by compromising safety.226 In the past, there have been notorious 
regulatory crackdowns that have resulted in the shutdown on many 
Chinatown bus lines.227 Similarly, by avoiding routes confined to an urban 
area, these operators do not face the aforementioned issues regarding 
competition with public transportation.228 
As the sector grows, however, it will likely need to confront 
challenges associated with curbside pickup and drop-off. In Boston, for 
example, such regulation prevents carriers from operating from the city’s 
Chinatown district, which has prompted most scheduled intercity bus lines 
in the city to use the South Station Bus Terminal, which requires a usage 
fee.229 In New York, curbside operators operating on advertised schedules 
must obtain permits to serve a specific location.230 As the quantity of 
crowdfunded bus service grows, it may be only a matter of time before 
authorities push for operators to comply with such regulations or, 
ultimately, move arrivals and departures to off-street locations. This sector 
may also encounter resistance from more established bus lines who regard 
newer firms as “below the radar” operators that skirt regulation. Still, at 
present, the prospect of such challenges seems speculative. Skedaddle and 
other firms remain small and largely regarded as high-tech charter lines that 
remain free of much of the regulation that Greyhound, Megabus, and other 
lines face. 
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II. TYPOLOGY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The remarkable innovation, expansion, and increasing financial 
viability of shared-mobility firms in cities suggests that collaborative 
consumption will continue to reshape the structure of urban transportation 
in profound ways. Each of the sectors profiled are scalable due to their 
smoothly functioning communication platforms. The enormous popularity 
of Lyft and Uber suggests that consumers are quick learners when it comes 
to experimenting with new mobility options. As these and other app-based 
mobility services grow more prevalent, policymakers and legal analysts will 
need to confront issues that were difficult to imagine only a few years ago. 
To illustrate the different types of shared mobility available in the 
marketplace, it is useful to review the differing qualities and strategic 
orientations of the participating firms discussed in this study (Table 1 
below). As Table 1 shows, among seven categories of firms, four have 
business-to-consumer orientations, while two are best regarded as having a 
peer-to-peer focus. Five firms—Bridj, Rally Bus, Skedaddle, Scoot, and 
Via—operate their own vehicles, while others use contractors to provide the 
transportation service. Only in the case of carsharing is the consumer 
behind the wheel. 
Table 1 also shows the major regulatory challenges that each sector 
now faces—or may soon face—as well as the mode of transportation that it 
is most apt to replace. The final column identifies those modes that tend to 
accent existing transport modes (rather than replace them), by providing a 
“first/last mile” solution (such as linking a user’s place of residence with a 
transit stop). 
For example, the table shows that car2go, Enterprise, Zipcar, and 
other carsharing companies follow a business-to-consumer model and are 
among the few in the shared-mobility space that are vehicle providers. For 
these companies, taxes and rules governing car rentals loom largely, as do 
policy challenges. The firms also primarily attract consumers who would 
otherwise own private vehicles and are not seen as prominent “first/last 
mile” solutions. 
These results show the breadth of policy issues and research 
questions raised by the growth of the shared-mobility sector. The policy 
issues facing ridesourcing providers, like Lyft and Uber, as well as 
microtransit operators, like Bridj and Chariot, appear most problematic, 
while those offering crowdfunded intercity bus services seem to be the least 
severe. Among this list, carsharing stands out for being the only sector 
taxed at a retail level, an issue that appears to be more problematic as 
competition intensifies. 
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TABLE 1: Mobility Providers in the Sharing Economy  
(Listed in Order Presented in this Report)  
 
 
Interpreted broadly, the analysis in this paper shows that the shared 
mobility sector is extraordinarily diverse but broadly divisible into four 
categories. For all of the excitement and potential surrounding these firms, 
however, it is important to keep in mind that, aside from Lyft and Uber, 
almost all others operate at a relatively small scale. Carsharing is only a 
small percentage of the size of the car rental market.231 Microtransit appears 
to barely account for one decimal point in the overall ridership of the 
country’s public transit system.232 Scoot operates in only one city, while 
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Skedaddle is much smaller than the dozens of charter bus operators that run 
in the same geographic regions. 
All this nonetheless raises important questions that will affect the 
policymaking process. Will shared mobility reach such a scale that 
governments will make special accommodations and provide exemptions 
from regulation, perhaps in response to a public that has grown dependent 
upon them? Will the legal distinctions between these sectors become 
increasingly blurred as more innovation occurs, making policymaking 
challenges even more complex? Finally, will shared mobility mostly serve 
as an enhancement to public transit or will these different realms of 
transportation find themselves on a collision course? The answers will 
affect the public response to a sector that has pushed urban travel in 
directions that would have been difficult to imagine just a generation ago.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
